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The value of selecting the best forecasting model asthe basis for empirical economic policy
analysis is questioned. When no model coincides with the data generation process, non-causal
statistical devices may provide the best available forecasts: examples from recent work include
intercept corrections and differenced-data VARs. However, the resulting models need have no
policy implications. A ‘paradox’ may result if their forecasts induce policy changes which
can be used to improve the statistical forecast. This suggests correcting statistical forecasts by
using the econometric model’s estimate of the ‘scenario’ change, and doing so yields reduced
biases.
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1 Introduction
As the title of this volume indicates, the majority of Tom Rothenberg’s contributions to economet-
rics and statistics were in the ﬁelds of identiﬁcation and inference. However, we know that Tom
has an interest in all areas of econometrics, even though his awareness of the numerous difﬁcul-
ties to be overcome in undertaking applied work has so far led him to concentrate on theoretical
research topics. Therefore, we are delighted to offer our chapter on the use of econometric models
in forecasting and economic policy analysis as an indication of some more problems—as well as
an analysis of how several of these might be overcome.
A personal anecdote will explain our interest. When the ﬁrst author reported in Hendry (1981)
to the UK Parliamentary Select Committee on the Treasury and Civil Service Enquiry into Mone-
tary Policy, he complained about the proliferation of theoretical models and the dearth of reliable
empirical evidence; a decade later in Hendry (1991), he complained to the same committee (now
on Ofﬁcial Economic Forecasting) about the abundance of empirical evidence on forecasting—and
the absence of theoretical models! We hope to ﬁll a small part of that gap.
In Hendry and Mizon (2000), we investigated three aspects of the relationship between statisti-
cal forecasting devices and econometric models in the context of economic policy analysis. First,
whether there are grounds for basing economic-policy analysis on the ‘best’ forecasting system.
Second, whether forecast failure in an econometric model precludes its use for economic-policy
analysis. Finally, whether in the presence of policy change, improved forecasts can be obtained
by using ‘scenario’ changes derived from the econometric model, to modify an initial statistical
forecast. To resolve these issues, we analyzed the problems arising when forecasting takes place
immediately after a structural break (i.e., a change in the parameters of the econometric system),
but before a regime shift (i.e., a change in the behavior of non-modelled, often policy, variables),
perhaps in response to the break (see Hendry and Mizon, 1998, for discussion of this distinc-
tion). No forecasting system can be immune to unmodeled breaks that occur after forecasts are
announced, whereas some devices are robust to breaks that occur prior to forecasting. These three
dichotomies, between econometric and statistical models, structural breaks and regime shifts, and
pre and post forecasting events, remain central to our present results. Further particular concerns in
the present chapter are working with open models, and considering the effects of structural breaks
in cointegrating vectors.
A statistical forecasting device is taken to have no economic-theory basis (in contrast to econo-
metric models for which this is central), so even combined into a system will rarely have im-
plications for economic-policy analysis – and may not even entail links between target variables
and policy instruments. This feature will be true of the forecasting models we consider below.
Consequently, being the ‘best’ available forecasting device is insufﬁcient to ensure any value for
policy analysis. Some ‘forecasting models’, such as vector autoregressions (VARs) may also have
policy implications, and we comment on such VARs below, but that does not vitiate the previous
statement.1
The converse is more relevant: does the existence of a dominating forecasting procedure in-
validate the use of an econometric model for policy? In Hendry and Mizon (2000), our answer
1Sims (1986)regardsboth classes of modeldistinguished here as ‘forecasting’models, but arguesthat nevertheless
both can have policy implications.4
was almost the opposite of the Lucas (1976) critique: when forecast failure results from factors
unrelated to policy changes – as Stock and Watson (1996) and Clements and Hendry (2001) show
often occurs – an econometric model can continue to accurately characterize the response of the
economy to the policy, despite its forecast inaccuracy. However, failure may also derive from
incorrectly modeled policy reactions.
In this chapter, we show that when forecast failure results from an in-sample structural break
induced by a policy-regime shift, forecasts from a statistical model which is robust to the structural
break may be improved by combining them with the predicted response from an econometric
model of an out-of-sample policy change.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, we summarize the relevant fore-
casting and economic-policy concepts and issues to motivate the analysis, illustrated in section 2.1
by an example of forecasting and policy in the presence of regime shifts. Section 3 formalizes the
data generation process, namely a vector equilibrium-correction mechanism, and the forecasting
model used as a comparator. Section 4 considers the impact of structural breaks in an open sub-
model. Then, section 5 investigates the effects of these changes on forecasts from the statistical
device, before section 6 describes the policy-scenario changes. Section 7 presents the case for
combining the forecasts from robust statistical devices with policy-scenario changes, and contrasts
these with pooling and intercept corrections. We present conclusions in section 8.
2 Background
The literature on economic policy is vast, even restricting attention to its implementation to using
econometric models: related analyses include Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) on evaluating
policy regimes; Budd (1998) on conducting economic policy with and without forecasts; Britton
(1989) on the more general topic of policy making with macroeconomic models; Sims (1982),
Turner, Wallis and Whitley (1989) and Banerjee, Hendry and Mizon (1996) on the econometric
analysis of economic policy; and Burns (2001) on the costs of forecast errors in an economic-
policy context. However, the present focus on combining forecasts from models in the face of both
deterministic shifts and regime shifts is not prominent in that literature.
The speciﬁc rationale for our analysis is as follows. Using the taxonomy of forecast errors in
Clements and Hendry (1995), Hendry and Doornik (1997) establish that deterministic shifts are
the primary source of systematic forecast failure in econometric models. Deterministic variables
include intercepts and linear trends—variables whose future values are known with certainty. De-
terministic shifts are viewed as any change in the unconditional expectation of the non-integrated
transformations of the variables. In the simplest location model of a variable yt:
yt = α × 1+ut (1)
with α  =0where {ut} is I(0), a deterministic shift at T is:
yT+h = α
∗ × 1+uT+h ≡ α × µ + uT+h (2)
where µ = α∗/α  =1is the shifted intercept. Thus, shifts in parameter of deterministic terms
are equivalent to deterministic shifts, as are other factors that mimic deterministic shifts, such as
mis-estimating or mis-specifying deterministic components in models.5
The simulation evidence in Hendry (2000) conﬁrms their pernicious effects on forecasts, as
well as highlighting the difﬁculty of detecting other forms of break (i.e., those associated with
mean-zero changes). Also, Barrell (2001) illustrates their frequency by considering six major
episodes of change during the 1990s. Nevertheless, there exist devices that can robustify fore-
casting models against such breaks, provided the breaks have occurred prior to forecasting (see
e.g., Clements and Hendry, 1996, and Hendry and Clements, 2000): examples include impos-
ing an additional unit root, or adding a speciﬁc form of intercept correction. Such ‘tricks’ can
help mitigate forecast failures, but the policy implications of the resulting models are unaltered.
That result immediately nulliﬁes the value of judging policy implications by any forecast-based
criterion: whether or not a given model forecasts well after a break depends on its robustness to
deterministic shifts, not on its ‘closeness’ to the data generation process.
Importantly, no methods are robust to unanticipated breaks that occur after forecasts are an-
nounced, and Clements and Hendry (1999b) show that those same ‘robustifying’ devices do not
offset post-forecasting breaks. However, policy changes that occur post-forecasting will induce
breaks in any models that do not embody the appropriate policy links. Thus, such models lose
their robustness in that setting. Conversely, despite possibly experiencing forecast failures from
pre-forecasting breaks, econometric systems which do embody the relevant policy effects need not
experience a post-forecasting break induced by the policy-regime shift. Consequently, when both
structural breaks and regime shifts occur, neither class of model alone is adequate: this suggests
investigating whether, and if so how, they should be combined. Indeed, the best estimate of the
effects of an economic policy change should not be based on the model that is robust to the policy
change—its very robustness to the policy change lessens its value for predicting the consequences
thereof. Thus, eventhe existenceof a procedure that inthe presence of structural breaks and regime
shifts systematically produces better forecasts need not invalidate the policy use of another model.
Given the limited knowledge about the data generation process (DGP) that is available to in-
vestigators, we adopt a framework in which the DGP is unknown and non-stationary (due to both
unit roots and structural breaks), and the econometric model is mis-speciﬁed for that DGP. These
features seem descriptive of operational economic forecasting, and provide a rationale for using
‘intercept corrections’ and differencing transformations. A key consequence of these results is that
the best available forecasting model need not be based on the ‘causal determinants’ of the actual
economic process, and as the example in §2.1 shows, may be based on ‘non-causal’ variables, that
is, variables which do not enter the DGP.
The fact that a purely statistical device may provide the best available forecasts induces an
apparent paradox when policy change is feasible. In a world characterized by the framework we
adopt, when forecasting after a structural break, forecasts based on the currently-best econometric
model may be beaten by statistical devices. Assume for the moment that the statistical forecasting
model does not depend on any policy variables, and hence has neither policy implications, nor
produces any revisions to its forecasts following policy changes. These ‘best’ forecasts for some
future period are presented to the ﬁnance minister of a given country, who thereupon decides that
a major policy initiative is essential, and implements it. That the statistical forecasts are not then
revised would justiﬁably be greeted with incredulity. More pertinently, providing the policy model
did not fall foul of the critique in Granger and Deutsch (1992), so that changes to policy variables
did indeed alter target variables, then a better forecast seems likely by adding the policy change6
effects predicted by the econometric model to the previousforecasts. But thiscontradicts any claim
to the effect that the statistical device produced the best forecasts in a world of structural change
and policy-regime shifts.
The resolution depends on distinguishing between unknown, or unanticipated, breaks – where
(e.g.) differenced models may deliver the best achievable forecast – and known changes, the con-
sequences of which are partly measurable. The conclusion is that a combination of robustiﬁed
statistical forecasts with the scenario changes from econometric systems subject to policy inter-
ventions may provide improved forecasts. This is the subject of §7.
2.1 Forecasting and policy analysis across regime shifts
Hendry (1997) illustrates the potential role for statistical forecasting methods when an economy is
subject to structural breaks, and the econometric model is mis-speciﬁed for the DGP. He considers
an artiﬁcial economy where gross national product (GNP, denoted by y) is ‘caused’ solely by the
exchange rate (et) over a sample prior to forecasting, then the DGP changes to one in which y
is only caused by the interest rate (rt), but this switch is not known by the forecaster. The DGP
is non-dynamic, and in particular, the lagged value of y does not affect its behavior (i.e., yt−1 is
non-causal). Nevertheless, when forecasting after the regime change, on the criterion of forecast
unbiasedness, a forecasting procedure that ignores the information on both causal variables and
only uses yt−1 (namely predicting zero change in y by E[yt|yt−1]=yt−1) can have smaller bias
than forecasts from models which include the correct causal variable. Here though, neither the
statistical model, nor the econometric model based on past causal links, is useful for policy.
Since policy analysis conducted on an incorrect model is rarely useful, we now consider what
can be concluded in general settings. The paradigmatic example we have in mind is an economet-
ric model of (say) the tax and beneﬁts system which accurately portrays the relevant links, and
yields a good approximation to the changes in revenues and expenditures resulting from changes
in the basic rates. Thus, its conditional predictions are accurate. However, it would not neces-
sarily provide good time-series forecasts in an economy subject to structural breaks that affected
macroeconomic variables such as total consumers’ expenditure and inﬂation.
The policy implications of any given model in use may or may not change with a particular
regime shift. For the setting above, if the exchange rate did not alter when the interest rate was
changed in the ﬁrst regime, so rt had no direct or indirect effect on y in that regime, then the
policy implications of the ﬁrst-regime model would be useless in the second regime. That seems
unlikely here, though that might happen in practice. If et is altered by changes in rt, so will yt in
both regimes. Policy analysis involves estimation of the target-instrument responses, which in this
case means ∂yt+h/∂rt when yt is the target variable and rt the policy instrument changed at time
t when the focus is the effect h periods later. For the statistical model ∆yt = ςt, this response
is zero at all forecast horizons h, and so despite its robust forecasting abilities, such a model is
uninformative for policy analysis. The ﬁrst-regime econometric model, on the other hand, does











In regime-2, the actual policy response is ∂yt+h/∂rt, so the regime-1 econometric model policy
responses in (3) will be valuable when they have the same sign, and do not over-estimate the
response by more than double, whereas the statistical model is always uninformative in that it
gives a zero policy response.
The next section formalizes a more general assumed DGP, before establishing results for fore-
casting in the face of both structural breaks and regime shifts, when the DGP is a cointegrated
system dependent on policy-determined variables. In §7, we explore the possibility that some
combination of statistical forecasts and estimated policy responses could dominate either alone.
3 The data generation process
The context for our analysis is an unknown in-sample DGP for the n = n1 + n2 I(1) variables
x 
t =( y 
t,z 
t), when yt includes target variablesand zt policy instruments,which is subject to both
structural breaks and regime shifts as in Hendry and Mizon (2000). In this section, we concentrate
on forecasting ∆yT+h+1 from time T + h when there was an unknown structural break at t = T,
and a known policy-regime shift at t = T + h +1 .
The class of DGP used in our analysis is a vector equilibrium correction model (VEqCM):
∆xt = τ + Γ∆xt−1 + αβ
 xt−1 +  t when  t ∼ INn [0,Σ], (4)




 xt]=µ ∀t. (5)




τ =( In − Γ)γ − αµ (6)
where E[∆β
 xt]=β
 γ = 0. Substituting from (6) into (4):
∆xt − γ = Γ(∆xt−1 − γ)+α(β
 xt−1 − µ)+ t.
Factorizing gives the in-sample open VEqCM, conditional on zt, representing the behavior of the




= Π(∆zt − γz)+Λ(∆xt−1 − γ)+λ(β
 xt−1 − µ)+ut (7)
and the in-sample marginal model of the policy variables zt:
(∆zt − γz)=Γz (∆xt−1 − γ)+αz (β
 xt−1 − µ)+ z,t (8)
when Π = ΣyzΣ−1










































in which Ω =( Σyy − ΠΣzzΠ ).
Unfortunately, the key to understanding the impact of policy changes in all such formulations
is hidden in the implicit parameter links. In particular, as discussed by Hendry and Mizon (2000),
if the parameters in (7) and (8) were unconnected, the system would manifest ‘policy ineffective-
ness’, in that only deviations of ∆zt from γz would have an impact, with changes in γz having no
effect when implemented by keeping ∆zt−γz ﬁxed. If so, only impulse responses would be of in-
terest. However, shifts in γz are likely to have an impact on ∆yt in practice, and hence we assume
γy = γ0 +Πγz, namely contemporaneous growth co-breaking (see Clements and Hendry, 1999a
and Hendry and Mizon, 1998). Then zt is both weakly and super exogenous for all the parameters
of interest in (7) when αz = 0, in which case λ = αy: this is assumed in the sequel. Thus:










 xt−1 − µ)+ut. (11)
When ∆yt and ∆zt have the same growth rate, γ0 = 0. Further, if Γzy = 0, then ∆yt would not
Granger cause zt, and zt would also be strongly exogenous.
The relevant policy instruments (e.g., interest rates and tax rates) are elements of zt that are
under the control of the policy agency (e.g., a central bank or Treasury). The fact that in modelling
zt it is treated as I(1) neither implies that it is intrinsically I(1) nor that it cannot be controlled
by the policy agency. Further, although (8) is the representation in the econometric model of the
evolution of zt, the marginal process may differ for particular policy rules in operation from time
to time (i.e., due to regime shifts): see e.g., Johansen and Juselius (2000).
3.1 Forecasting models
To establish the likely effects of structural breaks and policy-regime shifts on alternative forecasts,
a wide range of models could be considered. To illustrate the algebra, we ﬁrst analyze the prop-
erties of an open VEqCM, which is also the in-sample DGP and so correctly embodies policy
responses over that period. Then we contrast those ﬁndings with the outcome when using a diago-
nal VAR in second differences (denoted DDV), where every forecasting equation has the form:
 ∆yi,t =∆ yi,t−1
which therefore does not have any policy implications. Clements and Hendry (1999b) show that
these predictors have the same forecast biases for breaks that occur after forecasts are announced,
but that the DDV is robust to deterministic breaks that have occurred before forecasting: section 4
draws on their approach, extending it to open models and to forecasts of growth rates (rather than
levels). In terms of the example in section 7.3 below, we consider forecasting after a regime shift
resulting in a change in the appropriate measurement of the opportunity cost of holding money,
and so inducing a structural break in models not incorporating this change, but before a future
known policy-regime shift. Since the open VEqCM has some response to policy, but the DDV9
does not, such comparisons yield insights into the effects of using robustiﬁed forecasting methods,
then exploiting policy-change information via an econometric system.
In the present context, a VAR is simply the unrestricted version of the econometric model so is
subject to the same drawbacks, namely a lack of robustness to deterministic shifts, exacerbated by
the ill-determination of the estimated intercepts—which compound the (small) growth rates with
the (potentially large) equilibrium means—see equation (6) above. A VAR in ﬁrst differences is
mis-speciﬁedbyomittinganycointegrationrelations, oftenof centralconcern inpolicy,butthereby
gains robustness to equilibrium mean shifts (see e.g., Clements and Hendry, 1999a). Although
both these models are sometimes viewed as ‘statistical forecasting devices’ with possible policy
implications, and they lie intermediate between the econometric system in (4) below, and the DDV,
introducing them adds little to the understanding of the analysis: Clements and Hendry (1999a)
analyze their susceptibility to deterministic shifts.
4 The impacts of breaks on the VEqCM
Economic policy analysis, including forecasting after a structural break, is undertaken using the
open model in (11), which is assumed to be congruent and encompassing (see Hendry, 1995,
Mizon, 1995, and Bontemps and Mizon, 2001, for discussion of these concepts) for t<T .A
policy-regime shift in the DGP will result in a structural break in (7) unless the parameters of
the latter are invariant. Thus, we consider both the policy-regime shift and the structural break
affecting the system at time T. The policy change alters the instruments zt to z∗
t, by shifting γz to
γ∗
z for t = T,T+1,T+2,..., and hence γ shifts to γ∗. At the same time, there is a structural break
affecting the cointegration relations, which change from β to β
∗, with the new equilibrium mean
E[β
∗ x∗
t]=µ∗ accompanying the shift in the growth rate for t  T.We leave the other parameters
unchanged, since shifts in mean-zero I(0) combinations of variables do not seem to be of primary
importance for forecast failure. In this section, we consider the impacts of parameter changes in
the VEqCM DGP over the forecast period on the pre-existing model.
Following the parameter changes noted, (11) becomes:
∆y∗










+ uT+j for j ≥ 1.
(12)
The forecaster, though aware of the possibility of parameter changes, does not know their new
values. As a result, the open VEqCM (11) estimated using data up to t = T, and indeed for
t = T + j for j/T small, will suffer forecast failure due to the shift in µ to µ∗ and any additional
non-zero components deriving from the unmodeled change in the cointegration vectors.
4.1 Breaks in cointegration relations
The introduction of breaks in the cointegration relations raises a number of new considerations,
depending on whether the impact induces I(0) or I(1) departures. We consider these in turn.10
I(0) cases
This case includes the change from β to β
∗ simply being a linear transformation (rotation), so
there exists an r × r matrix D of rank r such that β
∗
= Dβ
  with a corresponding change in
the equilibrium mean to µ∗ = Dµ: such a situation is essentially one of no change, merely a
re-parameterization. Indeed:
∆y∗


































+ uT+j for j ≥ 1
(13)
where λ = λ
∗D.
Another class of change in β that leaves I(0) effects is when more cointegration relations occur.
Here r changes to r∗ (say), and so both λ and β are changed in dimension, but the outcome is the














so that we can link the DGP and the
forecasting model by:
∆y∗


































which is I(0) with a zero mean.
However, the outcome is less clear when fewer cointegration relations occur over the forecast
period, so some existing elements of β are eliminated. This is the case that r∗ <r , so partitioning
λ, β and µ into (λ1,λ2)=( λ1,0), (β1,β2) and (µ1,µ2) respectively:
∆y∗
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This is only I(0) provided that (β
 
2x∗
T+j−1 − µ2) remains I(0), in which case, u∗
T+j is still an I(0)
error with a zero mean, but such an outcome seems unlikely. Rather, although λ2 has become zero
in the DGP, the forecasting model retains linear combinations of I(1) variables that are now I(1),
and µ2 has no meaning. Nevertheless, the simulation results in Hendry (2000) suggest that such
changes are difﬁcult to detect empirically.11
A further case of interest is when r is unaltered but there is a set of k additional I(1) variables,
wt say, which are cointegrated within the DGP, but do not enter the forecasting model in any way.














is an r×(n + k) matrix.
Thus:
∆y∗

















 xT+j−1 − µ)+λ

β
+ wT+j−1 − ν

+ uT+j






 xT+j−1 − µ)+u∗





T+j = uT+j + λ

β
+ wT+j−1 − ν

,
which is I(0) with a zero mean provided both β
 xt and β
+ wt are I(0) individually. None of the
above types of I(0) change in β is liable tot induce forecast failure, and so they are not considered
further below.
I(1) cases




+ wt are not I(0) individually, so that the error in (14) becomes
u
∗
T+j = uT+j + λ

β
+ wT+j−1 − ψ − ν

.
Now the system that excludes wt will be seriously mis-speciﬁed: both (β
 xT+j − µ) and u∗
T+j
will be I(1). As a result (β
 xT+j − µ) could become large, so that forecast failure should rapidly
manifest itself in this case, forcing a revision to the model speciﬁcation. This case comes closer to
the situation considered in the example in section 7.3, in which the additional I(1) variable is Rm.
A further case arises when the rank remains the same, but now cointegration becomes deﬁned
by new coefﬁcients β
∗ when the error in (13) becomes
u
∗
T+j = uT+j + λ(∇β




∗ − β) and ∇µ∗ =( µ∗ − µ). Although (β
∗ xT+j−1 − µ∗) is I(0),
(β
 xT+j−1 − µ) will be I(1) and so the unmodiﬁed system will suffer similar consequences
to the I(1) mistake case noted above. Even if the equilibrium mean did not change, so that
∇µ∗ = 0,the same problems would arise since u∗
T+j will be I(1) via ∇β
∗ xT+j−1. For the most
favorable case for avoiding forecast failure, when µ = 0, the simulation results in Hendry (2000)
show quite high power in detecting such changes, at least in moderately large samples.
4.2 Post-break forecasts
We consider forecasting ∆yT+h+1 using information available at T + h for h ≥ 0 so that there
is an in-sample structural break—unknown to the forecasters. Ignoring estimator variances, and12
assuming accurate data, an economist using the open VEqCM with z∗
T+j+1 known, would produce
the 1-step ahead forecast:
 ∆y∗

















T+h+1, which has a forecast error:
	 uT+h+1|T+h =∆ y
∗
T+h+1 −  ∆y∗
T+h+1|T+h (16)





































when ∇µ∗ =( µ∗ − µ), ∇β
∗ =( β
∗ − β) and ∇γ∗ =( γ∗ − γ). Hence, the conditional mean of



































































In the absence of a structural break, the economist’s forecast would be unbiased, but otherwise
is shifted by the changes in the parameters of the deterministic variables and the cointegration
relation.
5 The impacts of breaks on the forecasting model
We now establish the likely effects of structural breaks and policy-regime shifts on the restricted
vector autoregression in second-differenced variables (denoted DDV above). It is shown that the
DDV can have a smaller forecast bias than the open VEqCM, because it is robust to forecasting
after the equilibrium-mean shift, though it will always have a larger forecast-error variance.





which has a forecast error:


































































































Thus the bias of the DDV forecast is 0, whereas the bias of the open VEqCM is (18), though as the
elapsed time, h, between the structural break and making the forecast increases, it is more likely
that the economist will become aware of the break. Nevertheless, it is possible for the DDV to have
a much smaller forecast bias than the open VEqCM, though it will always have a higher variance











Under the assumption that the DGP and the econometric model given in (7) and (8) coincide,
it is possible to derive forecast error means and variances for a wider range of the forecasting
methods than the open VEqCM and the DDV considered above. This was done in Hendry and
Mizon (2000) for a similar class of models and so is not repeated here. However, their results
emphasized the different susceptibilities of econometric models and robust statistical forecasting
devices to the unknown structural breaks and known regime shifts, thereby indicating possibilities
for using each to ‘correct’ the other.
6 Policy-regime changes
We nextconsider forecasting ∆yT+h+1 in the presence of a policyexperimentwhere an announced
policy shift of γ∗
z to γp
z takes place at T + h +1which induces a further shift in the equilibrium


















+  z,T+h+j for j > 1.
(26)
Because γp
y = γ0 + Πγ
p
z, this policy change results in:
∆y
p



























+ uT+h+j for j > 1.
(27)
The forecasting performance of the open VEqCM and the DDV is now compared with that of a
‘scenario-adjusted’ DDV forecast which combines information from each.14
7 Policy-change corrections to robust forecasts
Any need to combine two disparate models on the same information set is evidence that both are
incomplete: see Clements and Hendry (1998). The encompassing principle argues for ﬁnding the
congruent representation that can explain the failures of both models, but in the short-run doing so
may prove infeasible. When the two models are differently susceptible to the causes of predictive
failure, certain combinations could be beneﬁcial: however, the relevant combination must reﬂect
the motivation for pooling (namely, to take account of the effects of known breaks), rather than the
usual grounds as discussed in (say) Bates and Granger (1969).
The case of interest is when the robust forecast is made from the DDV, and that prompts a
policy response to change the provisional setting z∗
T+h+1 to the actual outcome z
p
T+h+1 (reducing
the rate of income tax, say, and thus increasing total ﬁnal expenditure x in the example in section
7.3). However, from (21) it follows that:
 ∆y
p
T+h+1|T+h =  ∆yT+h+1|T+h =∆ y
∗
T+h,


















































































Forecasts from the open VEqCM, on the other hand, are:
 ∆yp









































T+h+1|T+h denotes the forecast from (7) based on z
p
T+h+1 and  ∆yT+h+1|T+h that based
on z∗
T+h+1. There is no change in the bias relative to the policy-altered data. Consequently, if the
policy regime shift at t = T + h +1does not lead to a structural break in Π, the econometric
model would correctly predict the impact of the regime shift, despite the deterministic structural
break at t = T. This opens up the possibilityof a combined forecast performing well. In particular,
adding the scenario effect from (29) to the structuralbreak-robust DDV forecast to givea combined
forecast of the form:






T+h+1|T+h −  ∆yT+h+1|T+h

(30)15
which might avoid much of the structural break, yet capture some, and possibly all, of the policy
effect.





























Thus, in the absence of sampling variability and any model mis-speciﬁcations, the scenario-
corrected forecast would be unbiased, whereas each model alone would fail on the pre or post
forecasting changes.
7.1 Pooling forecasts
The outcome in section 7 can differ considerably from what would happen with ‘forecast pooling’.











while recognizing that other choices of weighting factors are widely used. The unconditional bias




















































































































Thus, there is little to be gained from average pooling (or related weights), since the requirement
of offsetting both the structural break and the regime shift involves all three models, with the
pre-regime change forecast entering negatively.
7.2 Intercept corrections
The intercept correction we have in mind is simply ‘setting the model back on track’ immediately
prior to the forecast calculation, corresponding to an impulse indicator equal to unity from time




























on average. Again, there are variance consequences (the forecast-error
variance is doubled for innovation errors), but these remain small relative to the sizes of the breaks
discussed in the example in the next section.
7.3 Example
A potential example is one in which yt includes real money holdings (m − p) (M1), inﬂation ∆p,
and real total ﬁnal expenditure x, whereas zt includes the opportunity cost of holding money. The
effect of the UK Banking Act of 1984, which made the payment of interest on checking accounts
legal, is represented in this framework by a change in the opportunity cost of holding money from
Ra, the return from an alternative asset to money (e.g., the three-monthlocal authorityinterest rate)
to Rn = Ra − Rm, when Rm is the interest rate paid on checking accounts. Money demand equa-
tions based on Ra experienced major forecast failure post 1985 as (m−p) increased dramatically,
although identical equations using Rn remained constant. Models of this aspect of the UK econ-
omy have been extensively analyzed by, inter alia, Hendry and Ericsson (1991), Boswijk (1992),
Johansen (1992), Hendry and Mizon (1993), Harris (1995), Paroulo (1996), Rahbek, Kongsted and
Jørgensen (1999), and Doornik, Hendry and Nielsen (1998).
Forecasting models of the DDV form, such as:
 ∆(m − p)T+1 =∆( m − p)T ,
did not suffer forecast failure from 1985 onwards. A government that was concerned about the
inﬂationary consequences of the large increase in M1 might have raised income taxes, providing
the combined event of interest.
Some representative orders of magnitude may help to indicate when, and why, the DDV might
dominatetheVEqCMinforecastingwhendeterministicandrelatedshiftsoccur. Inmanyestimated
econometric equations, residual standard deviations lie between 0.5% and 1.5% of the levels of the
dependent variables (albeit that some fall outside this region). Any deterministic shift in excess
of 2% will, therefore, favor the DDV in short-term forecasts. The example of the 1984 Banking
Act introducing interest-bearing sight deposits led to a more than 40% increase in holdings of
M1 over a couple of years; the 1986 Building Societies Act (the UK analogue of Savings and
Loans Associations in the US) which permitted borrowing on wholesale as well as retail money
markets, induced a doubling in mortgage lending over four years. Such massive shifts swamp any
uncertainty effects.
8 Conclusion
The best forecasting model is not necessarily a good basis for economic-policy analysis. When
models are mis-speciﬁed for a non-stationary data generation process, non-causal statistical de-
vices may provide the best available forecasts, but need have no policy implications. Moreover
intercept corrections act like differencing and improve forecasts without altering policy conclu-
sions. Conversely, forecast failure in an econometric model need not preclude its use for policy
analysis, since deterministic shifts need not alter policy reactions..17
The impacts of a range of structural breaks and policy regime shifts on both forecasting de-
vices are analyzed, and reveals that neither model is immune to both changes. Thus, we investigate
correcting the statistical forecast using the econometric model’s estimate of the ‘scenario’ change
resulting from the regime shift. The outcome shows a great improvement in robustness, and dom-
inates pooling the two forecasts, and perhaps even intercept correction.
Assuming that the econometric model coincides with the in-sample DGP is very strong, so
practical application will not attain the precise offsets found here. Any empirical policy model
will be invalid when it embodies the wrong causal attributions; its target-instrument links are not
autonomous; or its parameters are not invariant to the policy change under analysis. These are
distinct from the causes of forecast failure, though they could be a subset of the factors in any
given situation. None of these problems need be revealed in-sample, but the failure of the policy to
produce the anticipated results would do so, at a cost to society, offset by the beneﬁts of improved
knowledge of the economy. Nevertheless, the outcome seems unlike to be worse than using the
either model alone.18
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